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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The garden is a busy place in Fourth Amendment lore, for it is the site 
of recurring attempts by police officers to investigate criminal activity 
free from the constitutional restraints of the probable cause and warrant 
requirements.  The target of police intrusions may be the garden itself, 
the interior of the home beyond the garden, or the opportunities for 
discoveries to be made in both locations.  In 1986, the Supreme Court 
divided five to four in California v. Ciraolo,1 holding that police officers 
did not perform a constitutional “search” or “seizure”2 when they used 
an airplane to fly over an enclosed backyard, in order to look into the 
garden of a particular householder from 1000 feet in the air.  The 
officers spied incriminating evidence in that garden, which supplied the 
probable cause needed to obtain a warrant that allowed a search of both 
the yard and the house.3  The Court concluded that the householder could 
have no “reasonable expectation of privacy”4 from aerial police surveillance, 
because any member of the public “could have seen everything”5 
that the police officers observed, when flying at the same low altitude 
over the house and yard.  The plants in the garden were “readily discernible 
to the naked eye as marijuana,” and the Court viewed the officers’ aerial 
position as a “public vantage point,” similar to that obtained by travel 
upon “public thoroughfares.”6  Therefore, the Court determined that the 
householder “knowingly exposed” his enclosed backyard to the police; it 
was irrelevant that the officers, unlike the flying public, were conducting 
a targeted search for marijuana plants that they were trained to 
recognize.7
It was not surprising that the majority opinion in Ciraolo provoked an 
impassioned dissent.  The decision was unprecedented in sanctioning 
aerial surveillance as a police strategy for evading Fourth Amendment 
prohibitions of surveillance on the ground.8  The officers rented a plane 
because they did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant to enter 
and search the backyard, and because their attempts to peer into the yard 
were stymied by a tall fence.9  They could not crawl over the fence 
because that intrusion would violate the householder’s protected expectation 
 1. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 2. These Fourth Amendment terms of art should be treated as having quotation 
marks throughout this Article. 
 3. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 5. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14. 
 6. Id. at 213. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 225 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 209 (majority opinion).   
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of privacy in his “curtilage,” the Fourth Amendment buffer zone of land 
associated with the “sanctity” of a dwelling and the “privacies” of home 
life.10  Even in the absence of a high fence around the yard, the officers 
could not have crossed a smaller curtilage marker, such as a mow-line 
around a manicured lawn, in order to inspect the garden or peer into the 
windows of the house.11  With the curtilage boundary as the first constitutional 
line of defense for both the yard and the home, the police would never 
get to the windows without a warrant or exigent circumstances.12  Yet, 
the Ciraolo Court implicitly discarded the “personal and societal values” 
embodied in the curtilage barrier on the ground, by making the judgment 
that the same values did not justify the protection of the same home and 
garden privacy interest from a different point of police access.13
What was surprising about Ciraolo was that Justice Powell authored 
the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.  
Before Ciraolo, Powell had authored the opinion in Oliver v. United 
States, holding that no expectation of privacy could attach to land 
outside the curtilage, no matter how many “No Trespassing” signs a 
householder had posted on that land.14  Moreover, Powell agreed with 
the outcome reached in 95% of 133 search and seizure cases decided 
during his tenure on the Court.15  He wrote only two Fourth Amendment 
dissents in twenty-five years, and one of them was in Ciraolo.16  
Powell’s abandonment of his role as conservative centrist in order to 
 10. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).  See, e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 
993–94 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding officers violated curtilage by climbing fence). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1279 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding 
officers violated curtilage by entering lawn); State v. Ross, 959 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1998) (approving entry of curtilage when officers imitated normal conduct of 
social visitors). 
 12. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–87 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Whaley, 781 F.2d 417, 418–19 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that entry upon curtilage land to 
inspect suspicious plants visible from outside curtilage violated Fourth Amendment). 
 13. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182–83).  After Powell 
retired from the Court, the Court decided another curtilage flyover case.  See Florida v. 
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 14. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (labeling all land outside the curtilage as unprotected 
“open fields” subject to police entry and visual surveillance). 
 15. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 571 (2001).  By contrast, 
Justices Marshall and Brennan agreed with the Court’s outcome in only 40% of these 
decisions.  Id. 
 16. See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, 
J., dissenting) (companion case to Ciraolo).  Justice Powell frequently authored concurring 
opinions in Fourth Amendment cases, while voting with the majority or plurality. 




dissent was one measure of the controversial nature of the Ciraolo 
decision.17
A notable achievement of the Ciraolo dissent was Powell’s clarification 
of the relationship between the curtilage doctrines and the expectation of 
privacy analysis inaugurated in Katz v. United States.18  At the outset, 
Powell’s opinion articulated a set of first principles to explain how the 
underlying purposes of Fourth Amendment protections are grounded in 
the liberty interest in freedom from surveillance.19  Powell recognized 
curtilage and home privacies as a single Fourth Amendment concept,20 
functioning within the framework of expectation analysis, and in turn, 
informing the application of that analysis.  He viewed the entire web of 
decisions relating to a particular type of police intrusion as relevant to 
expectation analysis concerning that intrusion.21  His Ciraolo dissent 
foreshadowed the interpretations of Katz and commitments made to 
privacy in Kyllo v. United States,22 and displayed a similar dedication to 
the effort to protect householders from police intrusions made possible 
by advancing technology.23  In the end, Justice Powell’s opinion served 
as an invitation to reimagine the judicial dialogue that may be used to 
debate the necessities for protections against police intrusions that occur 
either inside or outside our gardens. 
Part II.A of this Article describes Justice Powell’s first principles that 
framed his judgments in Ciraolo, and explores their significance by 
comparing them to the majority’s premises.  Part II.B focuses on Powell’s 
explication of the Katz framework and its relationship to the curtilage-
home privacy doctrines established before Katz.  Part III describes the 
defining moments for the back story of Ciraolo.  Part IV presents 
speculations as to how Justice Powell would have resolved privacy 
issues in cases after Ciraolo, based on the views in his dissent. 
 17. When almost 3000 decisions during Powell’s tenure were sorted into twenty-
one categories, it turned out that Powell agreed with the Court’s outcome in 90% or more 
of the cases in thirteen categories, and in 80% or more of the cases in six categories.  
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at xi, 571–72.  See also id. at 533 (noting that the Burger Court 
of the 1970s and 1980s “might more accurately be called the Powell Court” because 
Powell was “probably its single most influential member”). 
 18. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 219–20, 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing 
implications of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
 19. Id. at 217–19, 225–26. 
 20. Id. at 217–21. 
 21. Id. at 219–20. 
 22. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that thermal imager violates expectation of 
home privacy). 
 23. Compare id. at 34–35, with Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 218–19 & n.3 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
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II. THE ANATOMY OF JUSTICE POWELL’S CIRAOLO DISSENT 
A. First Principles for Articulating Fourth Amendment Liberties 
Justice Powell’s polestar for his Fourth Amendment compass was the 
Framers’ political “choice” to create a society in which “citizens” enjoy 
legal protections of the right to “dwell in reasonable security and 
freedom from surveillance.”24  These protections were not the maligned 
refuge of lawbreakers, but rather, the historic methods by which law 
enforcement practices were intended to be limited or prohibited,25 “in 
order to prevent ‘any stealthy encroachments’ of our citizens’ right to be 
free of arbitrary official intrusion.”26  Furthermore, the constantly improving 
investigative capabilities of police officers established a dominant 
Fourth Amendment priority—the need to construct new legal protections 
for security and freedom in place of outdated and ineffective ones.27
To guide courts in this task of designing new doctrinal safeguards 
against the evolving forms of Fourth Amendment harms, Justice Powell 
offered two insights.  First, the Katz question—Is there a reasonable 
expectation of privacy?—was the place to start the dialogue about these 
designs.28  This dialogue should incorporate the study of pre-Katz decisions, 
especially the opinions that explained the ways to construct new measures 
of Fourth Amendment harms in place of the obsolete and highly 
fictionalized “physical trespass” formula, which had obstructed the 
Court’s recognition of wiretapping as a search and seizure.29  Second, 
the ultimate abandonment of that formula in Katz embodied the Court’s 
commitment to discard doctrines that provided “no real protection” for 
 24. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 25. See id. at 226 n.11. 
 26. Id. at 217–18 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). 
 27. Id. at 217 (reasoning that “contemporary norms and conditions” must guide the 
task of updating the definition of searches and seizures). 
 28. Id. at 218. 
 29. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139–41 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting)).  See also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 




security and liberty,30 and to replace these castoffs with doctrines tailored 
to match the relevant new incarnations of surveillance.31
Powell’s second insight derived from his perception that the physical 
trespass formula served a protective function in an era when walls were 
reliable barriers, and when intrusions could not be performed without the 
proximate presence of visible, tangible, recognizable, official intruders.  
But that function eroded with the arrival of devices that empowered 
officers “to see people’s activities and associations, and to hear their 
conversations, without being in physical proximity.”32  Therefore, the 
significance of the Katz Court’s abandonment of the physical trespass 
formula had little to do with an aversion to property law, and everything 
to do with the failure of the formula to address the harms of “silent and 
unseen invasions” of privacy rights.33  The officially approved replacement 
for the physical trespass formula became the requirement of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which reshaped the definitions of searches and 
seizures with a focus on “the interests of the individual and of a free 
society.”34
What was notable about Powell’s first principles?  He recognized the 
richness of the privacy concept by affirming its dimensions of “security” 
and “freedom,” and similarly translated the old-fashioned, literalistic 
terms, searches and seizures, into “surveillance.”  These rhetorical choices 
echoed the language of Fourth Amendment precedents before and after 
Katz, and captured Powell’s vision of the privacy interest at stake in 
Ciraolo.35  The connotation of security delivered a portrait of the 
psychological states of feeling safe from danger and fear, while the 
concept of freedom conjured images of behavior, such as ease of 
movement, frankness of speech, and the power to act without subjection 
to the power of the government.36  By contrast, the term privacy may 
 30. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining the need to 
provide “real protection against surveillance techniques made possible through 
technology”). 
 31. See id. at 218 & n.3 (citing Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(declaring that “the privacy of the citizen is equally invaded” by “new methods” of 
surveillance “that penetrate walls and overcome distances” as by “the direct and obvious 
methods of oppression which were detested by our forbears”)). 
 32. Id. at 218. 
 33. Id. at 226.  See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 
297, 315–21 (1972) (requiring warrants for domestic wiretapping surveillance program). 
 34. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 35. See id. at 226 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885)) 
(explaining the essence of Fourth Amendment violations as including “the invasion” of 
the rights of “personal security” and “personal liberty”).  See also Thomas K. Clancy, 
What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 307, 344–48 nn.255–57, 276 (1998) (citing cases). 
 36. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1575 
(4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/security (last visited 
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connote the narrower senses of its Shakespearian era origins, including 
conditions of seclusion, concealment, and isolation from the sight and 
presence of others, from their intrusions or disturbances, or from their 
access to knowledge of one’s personal matters.37  The difference between 
privacy conceived as liberty or security and privacy conceived as 
concealment was reflected in the contrasting characterizations of the 
defendant’s experience in Ciraolo.  As the Court described it, Ciraolo’s 
expectation was the “hope that no one would observe his unlawful 
gardening,”38 but for Powell, Ciraolo’s expectation was the desire to enjoy 
life outside “in his backyard,” a “family area,” containing “a swimming 
pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activities.”39  Powell 
saw Ciraolo as speaking for all people with backyards, who wish to live 
under the “open air and sunlight,”40 not hidden away in their houses or 
under large tents, but secure in the peace and intimate atmosphere of an 
afternoon family picnic or a solitary swim in the nude. 
Powell’s use of the term surveillance captured the special connotation 
of police gathering of data, deriving from its origins as “seemingly a 
word of the Terror in France.”41  While the Ciraolo majority ignored 
Powell’s use of the terms security and freedom, his use of the terms 
surveillance or aerial surveillance was contested in a tug of words that 
demonstrated the emotional power of Powell’s vocabulary.42  Chief 
Justice Burger substituted the terms observation or aerial observation to 
Sep. 5, 2007) (security); DICTIONARY.COM UNABRIDGED, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/freedom (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (freedom). 
 37. See 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 515 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner 
eds., 2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/“privacy” (last visited 
Sep. 5, 2007) (privacy); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1396 (4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
privacy (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (same). 
 38. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212. 
 39. Id. at 222 & n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 225 n.10.  Compare id. (“[A]fter today, families can expect to be free of 
official surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their homes.”), with 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
402 (1977) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should not require people to seek 
protection from surveillance “by retiring to the cellar” or permit people “to be driven 
back into the recess of their lives by the risk of surveillance”). 
 41. See ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, available at http://www.etymonline. 
com/index.php?term=surveillance (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (surveillance); id. (noting 
French origin as surveiller); DICTIONARY.COM UNABRIDGED, http://dictionary.reference. 
com/browse/surveillance (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (surveillance). 
 42. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216–26 & nn.3, 10 (Powell, J., dissenting) (using the 
terms surveillance or aerial surveillance at least twenty times). 




serve as neutral descriptions of the flyover, invoking an aura of passive 
conduct unrelated to police status, implicitly equating the actions and 
powers of police officers with those of anyone else.43  Burger also 
implicitly disputed Powell’s use of the term surveillance to include all 
acts of police collections of data, by rejecting the notion that visual 
detection practices, such as aerial monitoring of backyards, could be 
viewed as posing similar dangers to privacy interests as aural detection 
practices, such as the electronic monitoring of telephone calls prohibited 
by Katz.  In Burger’s view, the Katz Court’s concern with devising 
protections from the nonphysical police intrusions could not have been 
“aimed at” the police practice of “simple visual observations from a 
public place,” which is how he characterized the flyover inspection in 
Ciraolo.44
Other conflicts between Powell’s first principles and the Ciraolo 
majority’s premises could be characterized as differences of perspective 
that produced completely different frames for the Ciraolo problem.  
Burger assumed that Powell’s fears about the dangers of stealthy 
intrusions of advancing technology could be set aside, because the Katz 
Court would not have considered aircraft to be “electronic” devices, or 
viewed “flight in the public airways” as anything but “routine.”45  Similarly, 
Burger brushed off Powell’s concern about the need for protections 
against “broad and unsuspected governmental incursions” into “cherished 
privacy” of large numbers of “law-abiding citizens.”46  During the flyover, 
the officers photographed not only Ciraolo’s yard, including his pool and 
patio as well as his garden, but also his home, and the homes and yards 
of his neighbors.  Powell characterized this conduct as “indiscriminate” 
surveillance,47 as a reminder that officers performing an airborne mission to 
photograph a particular backyard would not be likely to avert their eyes 
from their view of all the curtilages and homes on their aerial route.  But 
the significance of the photographic intrusions in Ciraolo was dismissed 
by Burger as irrelevant, because the photograph attached to the warrant 
 43. Id. at 209–16 & nn. 1, 3 (majority opinion) (using the terms observe, 
observing, observation(s), or aerial observation(s) at least thirty times, while using the 
word surveillance only twice, once in reference to “electronic surveillance,” and once in 
reference to “a method of surveillance”). 
 44. Id. at 214 (concern with protection of telephone booth conversations about 
crime “does not translate readily” into concern with protection of backyard drug 
cultivation). 
 45. Id. at 215. 
 46. Id. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312–13 (1972)). 
 47. Id. at 225. 
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affidavit did not reveal the color of the suspect plants.48  To the Court 
majority, police flyovers did not present a serious threat “to privacy 
interests in the home,” and so could be allowed to “escape entirely” from 
“Fourth Amendment oversight” by the courts.49  Powell considered both 
the Court’s result and reasoning to be “flawed.”50  They “depart[ed] 
significantly”51 from Katz expectation analysis, and they were “curiously 
at odds” with curtilage-home privacy doctrines.52  For Powell, these were 
strong words.53
B. The Fifth Wall and the Second Ceiling: Powell’s Understanding of 
Katz’s Protection of Curtilage-Home Privacy 
Compared to Powell’s exegesis of Katz and its relationship to pre-Katz 
precedents, Burger took a much simpler approach in Ciraolo.  He 
resolved the privacy issue by relying mainly on a few post-Katz privacy 
decisions,54 reducing the reasoning of each decision to a maxim or two, 
and applying the maxims by analogy to the police flyover.  In Powell’s 
eyes, however, Burger only purported to reaffirm the analytical 
framework of Katz with regard to the question whether “society was 
prepared to recognize” the protection of Ciraolo’s privacy interest “as 
reasonable.”55  One flaw in the Ciraolo opinion was the failure to consider 
the appropriate factors for answering that question, as endorsed in a variety 
of precedents.  A more complex flaw was the Court’s unwillingness to 
recognize the validity of the operation of pre-Katz curtilage doctrines, 
and its tolerance for destabilizing the requirements of those doctrines 
through the use of the knowing exposure concept, interpreted expansively in 
post-Katz precedents but even more expansively in Ciraolo. 
 48. Id. at 212 n.1 (majority opinion) (finding police testimony sufficient to support 
warrant, making it unnecessary to address relevance of photograph of curtilage to privacy 
issue). 
 49. Id. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Karo, 469 U.S. 705, 
716 (1984)). 
 50. Id. at 223. 
 51. Id. at 216. 
 52. Id. at 219. 
 53. Id.  See JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 559. 
 54. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210–13 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 
(1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
 55. Id. at 219 (Powell, J., dissenting). 




Powell’s list of factors for assessing privacy expectations began with 
the determination of the “personal and societal values” at stake in the 
protection of curtilage from aerial surveillance.56  The Ciraolo majority 
made passing reference to this point,57 but then ignored the remaining 
factors on Powell’s list, including the “understandings that are recognized 
and permitted by society,”58 and the “societal understanding that certain 
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection,”59 such as the home, which 
stands “at the very core of the Fourth Amendment,”60 and in which a 
subjective expectation of privacy “virtually always will be legitimate.”61  
Relying on Oliver’s recognition of the curtilage as “part of the home 
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,”62  Powell treated the curtilage as 
deserving the same “scrupulous” protection because of its inseparability 
from the home; without using the term curtilage-home, he consistently 
treated the two legal constructs as one.63  Other factors on the list included 
the intention of the Framers, the uses to which a person has put a 
location,64 and the common law generally,65 including concepts of “real 
or personal property law.”66  The expectation for curtilage privacy qualified 
as “reasonable” in light of these sources.  For example, the curtilage 
concept defined the scope of common law burglary,67 and it was the area 
understood by the Framers to be associated with the intimate or domestic 
activity of the home.68
If Powell had authored a majority opinion protecting the privacy 
interest in Ciraolo, he could have rested his decision upon this list of 
factors and his first principles for interpreting Katz.  Neither analytical 
foundation pointed to a distinction between a home dweller’s ground-
level expectations and aerial expectations of privacy that would justify a 
Fourth Amendment loophole for flyover inspections.  Powell viewed the 
 56. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182–83). 
 57. Id. at 212 (majority opinion) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181–83). 
 58. Id. at 220 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
143 n.12 (1978)). 
 59. Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178). 
 60. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 364 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 61. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 425 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)); see also id. at 219 
n.4 (writing that “legitimate” and “reasonable” are interchangeable terms). 
 62. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180). 
 63. It is easy to recognize the curtilage as a construct, but so is a home.  See Robert 
J. Leibovich, Note, Privacy Goes Camping: Staking a Claim on the Fourth Amendment, 
26 U. MEM. L. REV. 293, 303–14 (1995) (discussing cases addressing the question 
whether the Fourth Amendment protections of a home attach to a camping tent). 
 64. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178). 
 65. Id. at 217. 
 66. Id. at 220 n.5 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)). 
 67. Eric Dean Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial 
Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 731–34 (1985). 
 68. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
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pre-Katz curtilage doctrines as establishing both an invisible fifth wall 
that prohibited the entry and presence of police in a backyard, and an 
invisible second ceiling that provided the equivalent protection from 
airborne police inspectors.  In Powell’s judgment, the curtilage concept 
created “real protection” against evolving police surveillance methods 
such as the flyover.  Implicitly, he viewed curtilage doctrines as bearing 
no resemblance to the unprotective physical trespass doctrine abandoned 
by Katz in the electronic surveillance context. 
Powell did not explain the significance of his disagreement with the 
Court’s failure to use his list of factors to guide its decision.  He let the 
cited sources for each factor speak for themselves, and they revealed his 
position that all Fourth Amendment privacy issues shared common 
ground.  Precedents regarding warrant exceptions appeared as the source 
of authority for some of Powell’s factors.  He recognized what the majority 
declined to consider, which was that such precedents usually included 
evaluations of the strength or weakness of the privacy expectation that 
was assumed to exist in each case.69  The particular significance of Powell’s 
commitment to casting a wide net for ideas about privacy was that the 
warrant-exception decisions repeatedly emphasized the values of home 
privacy, thereby supporting his reasoning concerning the powerful need 
for protecting curtilage-home privacy in the context of aerial surveillance.70
The more general significance of Powell’s position was that it reflected 
one of his first principles, that evolving police practices required the 
tailoring of new protections to match them.  Powell recognized that the 
validation of a reasonable privacy expectation constituted a presumptive 
decision that the only adequate protection for that expectation consisted 
of the warrant and probable cause requirements.  Therefore, the warrant 
precedents were necessarily relevant in recognizing how a privacy 
interest should be defined.  Powell did not care to measure privacy in the 
abstract for its own sake.  Rather, he wished to expose all the concerns 
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could contribute to a judgment 
about whether to require police officers to comply with warrant protections. 
The implied position of the Ciraolo majority, considering the message 
presented by Burger’s citations, was that the only significant authorities 
for determining the validity of a privacy expectation, as a threshold issue, 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6–13 (1977), abrogated by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 70. See, e.g., Steageld v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–12 (1981); Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980). 




were other precedents resolving the same issue.  This position restricted 
privacy analysis in two different ways.  First, Burger’s perspective 
dramatically narrowed the range of ideas that could inform a debate 
about the significance of allowing a particular unregulated intrusion to 
affect the lives of citizens in a free society.  Second, his limited analysis 
magnified exponentially the precedential power of analogy-making as a 
determinant of results in privacy cases.  With only privacy precedents on 
the table, in each new privacy case the courts would be forced to stretch 
potentially inapposite holdings to reach the new scenario.  In this way, 
Burger’s perspective endowed each anti-privacy precedent with greater 
influence than it would be accorded in Powell’s analytical world.  The 
Ciraolo majority’s reasoning displayed each of these features of the 
closed world of privacy precedents.  For example, Burger reasoned that 
the police conduct of visual surveillance on public streets, by means of 
tailing a suspect on foot or by car, so as to gain only the knowledge of 
her route, resembled a flyover in which police took photographs of a 
backyard that they were prohibited from inspecting at the ground level.  
By contrast, Powell recognized the value of expanding the dialogue of 
privacy debate beyond the similarity of Katz’s phone booth to Ciraolo’s 
garden.71
Powell explained his reasons for objecting to the more complex flaw 
in the Ciraolo opinion in some detail, and he candidly identified 
Burger’s knowing exposure theory as a fiction that allowed judges to 
impose the risks of police surveillance on people whose activities were 
subject to public scrutiny.72  After Ciraolo, those risks would fall on a 
broad class of mostly law-abiding people who wished to enjoy life 
outdoors in their yards.73  Powell compared the claimed similarities 
between the risks actually taken by such home dwellers and the risks of 
police surveillance imposed in Ciraolo, and concluded that the Court’s 
claim of equivalence was so implausible as to deserve rejection.74  If 
Ciraolo’s home were not located in a flight path for landing or takeoff, 
Powell regarded it as extremely unlikely that a traveler’s plane could be 
flying at a sufficiently low altitude to see the garden.75  He emphasized 
that a traveler would not be trained to recognize marijuana, would not 
know Ciraolo’s identity, would have no reason to glance out the window 
except serendipitously, and would have only the briefest of opportunities 
 71. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214–15. 
 72. Id. at 224–25 & n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 229 n.10. 
 74. Id. at 224–25.  Compare Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New 
Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 627–39 (1989) (explaining 
proposal for assessing risk of exposure for expectation analysis). 
 75. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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to view the scene.  Police officers in a flyover operation would exhibit 
none of these characteristics.76  Thus, the Court’s decision forced home 
dwellers without total tent coverage to accept an invasive risk of police 
surveillance as the consequence of choosing to live with an extremely 
remote risk of fleeting public scrutiny. 
The Ciraolo majority, however, did not claim that the risk of public 
scrutiny was meaningful, only that it existed.  Nor did the majority claim 
that the purposeful police officers and the clueless traveler constituted a 
similar risk.  Chief Justice Burger simply treated the dissimilarities as 
irrelevant.  By contrast to the candor and realistic assumptions underlying 
Powell’s arguments, Burger’s arguments possessed the character of 
hardened fictions that cannot be answered.  The knowing exposure maxim 
had become the substitute for physical trespass, a barrier to the recognition 
of real privacy harms.  The expectation inquiry no longer exhibited judicial 
sensitivity to personal and societal values, exemplified in Katz’s concern 
with the “vital role” of the telephone in “private communications,”77 and 
pre-Katz concerns for the protection of the confidentiality of beliefs and 
thoughts.78
Powell’s critique of the knowing exposure theory also included his 
objection to the incompatibility of that theory with curtilage doctrines.  
The fence around Ciraolo’s backyard obscured more than the view of the 
police officers; it also obscured the point that for ground-level protection 
of the curtilage, no fence was necessary.  Its existence was merely a 
factor enhancing the eligibility of the yard for curtilage status.  Even 
without the fence, a police officer who wished to inspect a backyard 
would be tethered invisibly to the sidewalk.  She would be free to 
exercise the power of plain view, but she could go no further, either to 
cross the curtilage boundary on foot, or to climb a tree or a ladder to get 
a better view, as Powell pointed out.79  Yet nothing would prevent a 
passerby from entering a curtilage, other than the ire of the home dweller 
or threats of legal action when discovered.  Thus, no equivalence existed 
between the ready access of the walking or tree-climbing public and the 
forbidden access of the officer.  The curtilage-home privacy rules left no 
room for the application of a knowing exposure theory, but embodied 
 76. Id. at 223–24. 
 77. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 78. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
 79. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 222 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing cases). 




the opposite perspective that police officers and curious passersby had 
nothing in common.  The unique police threat of surveillance on the 
ground would never be conflated with the risk of intrusions by random 
unwelcome visitors without a badge.  Paradoxically, the Ciraolo majority 
decided that the curtilage taboo that kept police officers from climbing 
trees should not keep them from hovering at a somewhat higher distance 
where the access of curious passersby was “virtually nonexistent.”80
The Ciraolo majority also managed to perpetuate a sense of uncertainty 
about the application of the Katz framework in the curtilage-home context.  
Powell treated the undisputed finding that Ciraolo’s yard qualified as 
curtilage as sufficient proof of his subjective manifestation of a privacy 
interest required by Katz.81  Similarly, after noting that it was unnecessary 
for the Court to address the manifestation issue, Burger added that 
Ciraolo had “met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and 
desire to maintain his privacy.”82  But then, Burger found it “not entirely 
clear” whether Ciraolo had manifested his expectation “from all observations 
of his backyard,” pointing out that a citizen or police officer “perched on 
the top of a truck or a two-level bus” might observe the plants in the 
garden.83  Yet if Ciraolo did not adequately manifest his expectation from 
aerial observation, there was no need to address the question whether his 
expectation was reasonable.  Burger also noted that it would be unreasonable 
for Ciraolo to assume “his unlawful conduct w[ould] not be observed” 
by “a power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard.”84  
By these observations in dicta, Burger not only minimized the significance 
of the State’s concession that the backyard qualified as curtilage,85 but 
also implied that officers might gain lawful visual access to curtilage 
whenever their feet left the ground, in spite of curtilage rules to the 
contrary. 
The Ciraolo majority thus provided ambiguous signals to lower courts, 
although it was clear that home dwellers now possessed no reasonable 
expectation of privacy from naked-eye surveillance of curtilage land 
during flyovers at 1000 feet—a holding that was extended later to 
helicopters at 400 feet.86  Perhaps the Court’s reasoning also implied that 
 80. Id. at 223. 
 81. Id. at 213 (majority opinion). 
 82. Id. at 211. 
 83. Id. at 211–12. 
 84. Id. at 214–15. 
 85. Id. at 213.  Powell enumerated the lower courts’ factors for curtilage boundaries 
that produced this concession: “because of the close proximity of the yard to the house, 
the nature of some of the activities” conducted there, and because Ciraolo “had taken 
steps to shield those activities from the view of the passersby.”  Id. at 222 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
 86. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (White, J., plurality opinion). 
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the knowing exposure theory could be applied to other curtilage scenarios 
where police imitated the conduct of curious passersby.  Maybe the 
Court meant to encourage lower courts to go further, and allow police 
officers to climb utility poles or perch on passing trucks, in order to 
cheat the ground-level boundary rules against manipulating plain view 
opportunities to observe the curtilage.  However, the Court made no allusion 
to the significantly increased enforcement efforts to root out homegrown 
marijuana production, starting in the late 1970s at the time when 
successful eradication in Mexico suddenly opened a market for domestic 
cultivation of the drug.87  At least for the Ciraolo majority, expectation 
analysis did not include express consideration of law enforcement needs 
to escape the burdens of Fourth Amendment scrutiny because of the 
difficulties attendant in complying with the warrant requirement.  The 
burden was on Ciraolo to persuade the Court to recognize his Fourth 
Amendment privacy as a privilege.  It was not a right. 
III. THE BACK STORY FOR CIRAOLO: REFRAMING CURTILAGE AS A 
PROTECTION OF EXPECTATIONS 
The first defining moment that marked the beginning of the back story 
for Ciraolo was the silence of the Katz opinion in explaining how pre-
Katz doctrines, such as those protecting curtilage-home privacy, should 
be interpreted after the physical trespass concept was abandoned as a 
general requirement for searches and seizures.  Until Katz, the Supreme 
Court treated curtilage-home privacy issues as an uncontroversial part of 
the river of lower court Fourth Amendment interpretations that could be 
left to roll along undisturbed.  But the rhetoric of the Katz opinion displayed 
a confusing blend of caution and overstatement.  The overstatements, taken 
literally, could have been taken to imply that the protection of dwelling 
and curtilage should be abandoned, because the Fourth Amendment should 
protect “people, not places,” and because a “constitutionally protected 
area” was not a useful concept.88  It seemed more sensible to infer that 
Justice Stewart’s language expressed only excessive enthusiasm for the 
death knell of the physical trespass requirement, and perhaps an overly 
 87. Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line 
Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 964 & nn.128–33 (2004).  By 1986, Americans produced 
“up to half of the marijuana consumed domestically.”  See id. at 964 n.129.  Several 
amicus briefs argued that the value of curtilage flyovers in anti-marijuana enforcement 
programs justified the rejection of the privacy claim in Ciraolo. 
 88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 353 (1967). 




defensive attitude toward the reversal of precedent.  But after the Court 
adopted the vocabulary of “expectations” to describe the Katz privacy 
requirements,89 it seemed especially important for guidance to be 
provided as to how that vocabulary should be used to express the harms 
caused by invasions of curtilage-home privacy, now stripped of the 
unnecessary appendage of physical trespass.  This translation of expectations 
was difficult for some observers to envision, because the idea of trespass 
was stuck like glue to their visions of a police officer walking across a 
curtilage boundary, and because the idea of property was similarly stuck 
to the curtilage land.90
One source of inspiration could have been the law of burglary that 
gave rise to the curtilage concept before it became attached to the Fourth 
Amendment.  By analogy, the police officer in a post-Katz world could 
have been reimagined as a Fourth Amendment intruder who violated the 
security and freedom of a home dweller.  The burglary-based origins of 
curtilage could have been used to rub off the glue of trespass from the 
feet of officers treading upon the lawn next to a dwelling.  At common 
law, the object of punishing burglary was “not to prevent trespasses,”91 
but to punish entries that might frighten persons who might be present, 
because any intruder’s entry could signal danger.92  Admittedly, the crime 
included extraneous elements, requiring the night-time breaking and entry 
of dwellings or curtilage structures.93  But in spite of these technicalities, 
the burglary crime served to illustrate how the concept of a protected 
area could be intertwined with the protection of expectations of privacy. 
Moreover, even before Katz, the Fourth Amendment version of the 
curtilage concept was more expansive than the burglary concept, and 
encompassed the police crossing of the curtilage boundary to inspect 
visually whatever might be on the curtilage land.  This fifth wall of a 
dwelling established its value as a necessary barrier to police intrusion 
based on the “domestic activities” of the home dwellers that might occur 
within its confines.  Those activities continued in a different form, after 
 89. See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 
MISS. L.J. 143, 156–57 (2002) (noting that the Court “lost little time” in retroactively 
validating Justice Harlan’s “gloss” from his Katz concurrence in Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 
1 (1968)). 
 90. Compare Bender, supra note 67, at 736–38 (noting descriptions of curtilage as 
property concept), with United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 n.3 (1987) (recognizing 
burglary roots of curtilage concept). 
 91. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 74 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., 1963) (1881). 
 92. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *223 (explaining that burglary is a 
heinous crime because “of the abundant terror that it naturally carries with it” as a 
“forcible invasion and disturbance of [the] right of habitation”). 
 93. See Bender, supra note 67, at 731–33. 
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the passing of the era when “the kitchen, the laundry, the springhouse, 
the woodshed, and most particularly the ‘outhouse’” were not to be found 
“within the four walls” of houses.94  After Katz, it should have been 
easier to see that the feet of police officers on the lawn had always been 
covered with the intangible mud of expectations, and easier to explain 
how the curtilage idea was designed to protect “people” and their privacy 
rather than land per se. 
The second defining moment for the back story of Ciraolo occurred 
when lower courts decided to take different directions in their struggle to 
envision curtilage-home privacy violations as translatable into terms that 
expressed Katzian values.  These directions demonstrated confusion.  For 
example, one court stopped referring to curtilage when discussing privacy 
expectations in backyards, while others noted that curtilage boundaries 
would be at least relevant in determining the reasonableness of an 
expectation.95  Another direction illustrated the willingness of some courts 
to use expectation analysis to expand Fourth Amendment protection to 
“closed woods” as a special category of the open fields land that lay 
beyond the curtilage.  These courts relied on the theory that a home dweller 
might seek to preserve the wooded area as private, just as Katz closed 
the door of his phone booth.96
The Oliver opinion by Powell sought to wipe out one stream of confusion 
by implying in dicta that positive conclusions about reasonable privacy 
expectations were, indeed, expressed in the definitions of curtilage 
boundaries established in pre-Katz lower court decisions.  But Powell 
supplied no particulars of those definitions until his Ciraolo dissent 
named the factors used in the decisions cited in Oliver; perhaps he 
assumed that the longstanding factors were so familiar to lower courts as 
to require no repetition.  In Ciraolo, Powell recognized that the Court 
was rejecting aerial curtilage protection before it had even endorsed a 
definition of ground curtilage, and so he listed the lower court factors to 
 94. S. Brian Lawrence III, Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United 
States Gives Renewed Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment 
Analysis, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 813 n.101 (1985) (quoting Judge Charles E. Moylan, 
Jr., The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The 
Neglected Threshold of “So What?,” 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 87).  An important modern 
issue in curtilage doctrine is how to apply similar protections to urban dwellings.  See 
Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to 
Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 297 (2005). 
 95. See Bender, supra note 67, at 737–38 nn.68–77 (citing cases). 
 96. See Lawrence, supra note 94, at 804–05 & nn.73, 74. 




fill that vacuum.97  His Oliver opinion also shut off the stream of protection 
for closed woods in the open fields, pronouncing all open fields 
unprotected, whether open in a literal sense or not.98  But Oliver arrived 
too late and said too little to provide guidance concerning the applicability 
of non-curtilage expectation precedents to the problem of aerial curtilage 
protection.  During the era between Katz and Oliver, some of Justice 
Stewart’s statements in Katz had been transformed into new rhetoric for 
the restriction of privacy rights.99  The precedential landscape and rhetoric 
of the Ciraolo opinions were significantly affected by the Court’s delay 
in waiting until Oliver to discuss the character of home-curtilage privacy 
protection in the post-Katz world. 
By the time Ciraolo was argued, the third defining moment had ended, 
namely the era when lower courts grappled with the aerial surveillance 
problem.  Their diversity of views suggested that if Justice Powell intended 
to imply in Oliver that the curtilage doctrines should be left intact, rather 
than revised with the dissolving fluid of non-curtilage precedents, that 
message had not been heard.  Some lower courts adopted the opposing 
positions later espoused by Powell and Burger, while others worked at 
compromise, by attempting to distinguish between lawful aerial police 
observations that resembled those of a hypothetically “reasonably curious 
passerby” in the sky, and unlawful observations resembling those of an 
“unreasonably curious passerby” in that location.100  By this time, the 
byword for the manifestation concept had become a requirement to take 
“normal precautions” to maintain privacy.101  Some judges assumed that 
the manifestation element in an aerial case should require more than a 
simple finding of curtilage status.  If these judges had looked to Oliver 
for guidance on this point, they would have noticed that it was only 
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion that emphasized how some spaces 
like homes “are so presumptively private” that manifestation is 
 97. Compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(citing cases relying on such factors as the existence of an enclosure around the potential 
curtilage area, the proximity of the area to a dwelling, the “nature of the uses to which 
the area is put,” and the “steps taken . . . to protect the area from observation by people 
passing by”), with Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (same).  See also 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (endorsing same factors used in 
Ciraolo dissent for defining curtilage boundaries). 
 98. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178–84. 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–85 (1983); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 
(1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–45 (1979); see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 
211, 213 (citing Knotts, Rawlings, and Smith). 
 100. See Bender, supra note 67, at 746–48. 
 101. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105. 
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unnecessary.102  Yet even these judges took different directions, with 
some treating the failure to cover a backyard with a tent as a failure to 
take normal precautions, while others looked for a manifestation of 
ground privacy, such as a fence, before counting that as a manifestation 
transferable to the sky.103  As it turned out, the Court did not adopt either 
type of manifestation requirement, but decided instead that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from the type of surveillance in Ciraolo could not 
exist in an uncovered curtilage. 
Almost twenty years after Katz, the Ciraolo opinions finally exposed 
the Court’s own debate concerning the integration of curtilage-home 
privacy doctrines into the Katz expectation framework.  In the long run, 
the impact of that debate, if it can be judged from the content of an FBI 
lecture to agents on rules for curtilage surveillance,104 was to create a 
“highway in the sky” rule that has not undone the fifth wall of the 
curtilage boundary on the ground.105  But the taboo against climbing a 
few feet of fence in Kansas does not stop an officer from scaling a forty 
foot tree in Maryland.106
IV.  CONCLUSION: POWELL’S GARDEN IN LATER YEARS 
Justice Powell retired one year after his Ciraolo dissent, and for the 
next decade, he often sat by designation on federal courts of appeals.  It 
is tempting to speculate about how he would have voted in privacy cases 
if he had stayed on the Court.107  Perhaps he would have persuaded 
 102. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 193 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A] home is a place in which a subjective expectation of 
privacy virtually always will be legitimate . . . .”). 
 103. See Bender, supra note 67, at 746 n.121 (citing cases). 
 104. Peters, supra note 87, at 965 n.135 (citing John Gales Sauls, Curtilage: The 
Fourth Amendment in the Garden, http://www.totse.com/en/law/justice_for_all/curtilag. 
html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007) (providing hypotheticals and discussion of curtilage 
rules; authored by a Special Agent and Legal Instructor at the FBI Academy)). 
 105. See Bender, supra note 67, at 747 (citing Williams v. State, 277 S.E.2d 923, 
925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (making highway in the sky analogy)). 
 106. Compare State v. Waldschmidt, 740 P.2d 617, 623 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) 
(reasoning that “the curtilage doctrine would be meaningless” if a public vantage point 
under Ciraolo could be obtained by climbing a nearby fence), with Kitzmiller v. State, 
548 A.2d 140, 143 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (distinguishing impermissible ladder 
climbing from permissible tree climbing that produces airplane-type view like Ciraolo 
flyover). 
 107. See JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 556–57 (comparing Kennedy’s votes to those 
Powell might have cast).  Even if Powell had remained on the Court from 1987 until his 




Justice O’Connor to make his Ciraolo dissent into a majority rule, if he 
could have encouraged her skepticism about the frequency of public air 
travel at 400 feet.108  Perhaps he would have provided the fifth vote for 
the protection of a privacy expectation in garbage located on the 
sidewalk outside the curtilage,109 because he would have recognized how 
the knowing exposure theory, once endorsed, might travel irresistibly 
into the curtilage.110  It is difficult to know what he would have thought 
about knock and talks, those pretextual visits by police officers who use 
a driveway or curtilage path to gain access to a front door in the manner 
of a social visitor.  He might have approved of police imitations of the 
brief contacts of typical door-to-door solicitors; but he would have 
recognized that his own risk analysis in Ciraolo suggested that police 
officers bring entirely different risks to the front door than a neighbor 
who comes to borrow a cup of sugar.111  He joined the Court’s opinion 
holding that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search,112 
but he might have had qualms about the use of narcotics-detection dogs 
to sniff at cars during traffic stops.113  It is hard to imagine that he would 
have approved of the tactic of bringing these dogs inside the curtilage or 
up to a front door during a knock and talk.114  Moreover, if Powell’s 
willingness to protect containers such as luggage, whether in public or 
when placed in cars,115 is any guide, he would have agreed with the 
Court’s invalidation of luggage squeezes.116
death in 1998, he would not have voted in the cases discussed in the text at notes 113, 
116 & 117 infra. 
 108. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452, 455 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
 109. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988). 
 110. See generally Mark C. Anderson, Note, United States v. Redmon: The Demise 
of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Determinations? A Study of Garbage Searches on 
Common Property, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 61, 71–98 (1999) (analyzing expansion of 
Greenwood). 
 111. See Vanessa Rownaghi, Comment, Driving Into Unreasonableness: The 
Driveway, the Curtilage, and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1165, 1175–88 (2003) (comparing lower court interpretations of 
differences between curtilage analysis and Katz expectation analysis of police use of 
driveways and paths to enter curtilage). 
 112. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983). 
 113. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–11 (2005). 
 114. Compare State v. Davis, 711 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding 
dog sniff of apartment door in a common hallway is not a Fourth Amendment search but 
is a search under the state constitution), with State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1184 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding dog sniff of the front door of a house is a Fourth 
Amendment search).  See also Evan B. Citron, Note, Say Hello and Wave Goodbye: The 
Legitimacy of Plain View Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2761, 2786–808 (2006) (comparing “voluntary exposure” and “sanctity of the home” 
theories endorsed in conflicting lower court precedents). 
 115. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758–65 (1979) (Justice Powell writing 
for majority), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. 
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It seems very likely that Justice Powell would have approved of the 
Kyllo decision, which recognized that police conducted a “search” when 
they directed a heat scanner at the walls of a home.  The Kyllo Court 
shared Powell’s respect for the value of maintaining the “preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.”117  The Kyllo opinion echoed Powell’s commitment 
to establish doctrinal protections against future stealthy encroachments 
upon the core Fourth Amendment rights of home privacy.118  Powell’s 
Ciraolo dissent advocated a form of curtilage protection that eerily 
resembled Kyllo’s protection of the home from surveillance methods 
used to obtain information “that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’”119  So 
would Powell have objected to the thermal imaging device, which was 
aimed from outside the curtilage in Kyllo, but then have allowed police 
the unregulated power to stand outside the curtilage and peer into the 
nearby windows of a dwelling, if the “public vantage point” of the police 
position seemed fictional?120
Powell was a Justice who virtually never dissented in Fourth Amendment 
cases, but that may have been because he preferred not to dissent at all.  
His willingness to keep company in Ciraolo with the ideas of Justices 
Brandeis and Murphy, and his commitment to a dialogue that expressed 
the lived experience of the intangible harms of police surveillance, 




Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6–13 (1977) (joining Court majority), abrogated by California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 116. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336–39 (2000). 
 117. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 118. See id. at 34–36 (observing that Fourth Amendment definition of searches and 
seizures “must take account . . . of sophisticated systems” of thermal imaging technology 
“in development”); see also id. at 31 (citing recognition of home privacy as core right in 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 119. Id. at 34. 
 120. Even the act of peering into windows from outside a curtilage may constitute a 
search if the officer no longer occupies a public vantage point.  See State v. Carter, 569 
N.W.2d 169, 177–78 & n.12 (Minn. 1997), rev’d, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (finding it 
unnecessary to determine whether this kind of window peering would be a search 
because the defendants were temporary occupants who had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the premises). 
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